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Sourcing funding for the provision of new urban infrastructure has been a policy dilemma for governments around 
the world for decades.  This is particularly relevant in high growth areas where new services are required to support 
swelling populations.  Existing communities resist the introduction of new taxes to fund such infrastructure, hence 
the introduction of charges to the developer has flourished. 
The Australian infrastructure funding policy dilemmas are reflective of similar matters to some extent in the 
United Kingdom, and to a greater extent the United States of America.  In these countries, infrastructure cost 
recovery policies have been in place since the 1940’s and 1970’s respectively.  There is an extensive body of 
theoretical and empirical literature that discusses the passing on (to home buyers) or passing back (to the englobo 
land seller) of these increased infrastructure charges, and the corresponding impact on housing cost and supply.  
The purpose of this research is to examine the international evidence that suggests infrastructure charges contribute 
to increased house prices as well as reduced land supply. 
The paper concludes that whilst the theoretical work is largely consistent, the empirical research to date is 
inconclusive and further research is required into these impacts in Australia.   
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1. 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Sourcing appropriate funding for the provision of new urban 
infrastructure has been a policy dilemma for governments around 
the world for decades.  This is particularly relevant in high growth 
areas where new services are required to support swelling 
populations.  These new services generally include basic services 
such as local roads and water supply, but can also apply to broader 
community services such as off-site road and water facilities, 
schools, libraries and police stations etc.  Existing communities 
resist the introduction of new taxes to subsidise newcomers into 
their communities, hence the introduction of infrastructure charges 
paid by the developer has flourished. 
The Australian infrastructure funding policy dilemmas are 
reflective of similar matters to some extent in the United Kingdom 
(“UK”), and to a greater extent the United States of America (“US”) 
and Canada.  In these countries, infrastructure cost recovery 
policies have been in place since the 1940’s and 1970’s 
respectively.  There is an extensive body of both theoretical and 
empirical literature from a number of countries that discusses the 
passing on (to home buyers) or passing back (to the englobo land 
seller) of these increased infrastructure charges.  Regardless of the 
direction of passing and the various market elasticity’s, in the long 
term the outcome appears inevitable that house prices rise as a 
result of the infrastructure charges.  The question that remains in 
debate is:  by how much?  
In a climate where housing affordability is a policy objective 
for many governments, a clear understanding of the impacts of 
these government charges on the affordability of new housing is 
imperative,  
The purpose of this paper is to provide an up to date overview 
of international literature on this topic, examining both the 
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theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests infrastructure 
charges contribute to increased house prices either directly through 
the passing on of the associated costs, or indirectly via reducing 
land supply, which in a market with at least constant demand, will 
also lead to increased house prices.   
This review will form the basis for future research which will 
seek to quantify these price impacts on the housing market in 
Queensland, Australia.    
 
 
1.1. What are Infrastructure Charges? 
 
The term “Infrastructure Charges” is a term that is used to 
encompass the estimated proportionate cost of providing trunk and 
other off site urban infrastructure such as local roads, stormwater 
and community facilities/parks to new development.  It is a one off 
charge levied on the developer, generally at the time of 
rezoning/approval (2004, Campbell, 2004, Burge, 2008, Been, 
2005, Mathur et al., 2004) 
Around the globe, other terminology is used to describe what 
are essentially similar urban infrastructure funding mechanisms.  
For example, the term “Impact Fees” is used throughout the 
majority of the US, “Development Charges” is prominent in 
Canada, “Planning obligation”, “planning gain” or “Section 106 
agreements” are all terms used today to describe the equivalent to 
an infrastructure charging system in the UK (Evans, 2004a). 
“Exactions” is a general term used in Indian and some American 
literature, whilst in Australia “Infrastructure Charges” or 
“Developer Contributions” are largely interchangeable terms 
depending on the jurisdiction.  
For clarity, this paper uses the term infrastructure charges 
when referring to the one off fees chargeable by a local authority 
for the provision of urban infrastructure required to support new 
residential development.  Similarly, rates is used to describe 
regular local jurisdictional levies on existing home owners for the 
purposes of infrastructure repairs, maintenance and renewal, 
amongst other things.  Whilst not directly interchangeable, for the 
purposes of this paper this term is used in lieu of terms such as 
“property taxes” (US) . 
  
Given the topic of this research is based on house price impacts, 
the scope of this review is limited to residential development only.   
This paper is arranged as follows:  Section 1 has provided the 
introductory framework for the topic.  Section 2 details the 
methodology applied in the preparation of this paper.  Section 3 
outlines the theoretical research on this topic, with the empirical 
material covered in Section 4.  Section 5 discusses the phenomenon 
of “overshifting” in the context of the prior findings.  Section 6 
then concludes.   
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
A literature search identified a number of international studies into 
the impacts of infrastructure charges on new housing prices and on 
land supply.   
A very large number of academic, government and industry 
papers on the impact of infrastructure charges on new housing 
prices and/or land supply were identified.  A rich body of academic 
literature from North America was identified with a 2005 literature 
review referencing over 100 separate works from Canada and the 
US directly relating to this topic dating from the early 1970’s.  This 
extensive body of work is reflective of the maturity of the 
infrastructure charging regime in North America which has been in 
existence for over three decades.   
In the UK, an extensive amount of literature in the form of 
scholarly articles, government commissioned reports, and even 
multiple text books on the topic are available on wider structural 
planning issues affecting its housing market.  As broader structural 
planning issues are outside the scope of this research, this literature 
review has focused primarily on the direct issues relating to the 
financing of growth related urban infrastructure and the passing on 
or passing back price effects examined. 
The Australian academic literature was surprisingly sparse.  
One paper on the house price impacts of infrastructure charges was 
identified.  However, government and industry documents 
discussing infrastructure charges were in plentiful supply with 
numerous publications dating up to present day, reflecting the 
contemporary and evolving nature of infrastructure charging policy 
in this country.   
All literature used in this review were sourced via online 
database key word searches.  Other related works were sourced 
through the citations in primary research papers identified.   
 
 
3. THEORETICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Academics have been theorising on the impact of infrastructure 
charges on new housing costs from as early as the 1970’s.  Many 
academics have used urban economics supply curves to argue the 
phenomenon, some have presented mathematical proofs in 
evidence whilst others argue through scenario analysis based on 
different market conditions (elasticities).   
The premise for any price impact argument is based on the 
concept of who actually bears the burden of the infrastructure 
charge?  
Infrastructure charges were originally intended to transfer the 
burden of infrastructure provision in high growth areas from the 
public purse and existing owners on to developers (Evans-Cowley, 
2003).  However, the literature indicates there are a number of 
parties that may be potentially liable for the ultimate payment of 
these fees.  Apart from the developer, these include:  the original 
landowner, the new homeowner (Huffman et al., 1988), or the 
existing community (Singell and Lillydahl, 1990, Brueckner, 1997) 
or even other parties such as the providers of capital (Ellickson and 
Been, 2005).  There has been much debate over the past three 
decades on the on passing, back passing, shifting, back shifting  
(Huffman et al., 1988), overshifting (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004), capitalisation, backward capitalization (Burge, 2008) 
etcetera of these fees between the various parties to new 
development.  The following paragraphs discuss some of the more 
pertinent international literature on the home price impacts of 
infrastructure charges. 
 
 
3.1. The Developer 
 
Consider first the original intended payer of these costs, the 
developer.  Upon introduction of infrastructure charges, developers 
are faced with the dilemma of either increasing sales prices to 
recoup the additional costs (pass on), absorb the fees by way of 
lower profit margins, or pay the land owners less for the englobo 
land in the first place (pass back) (Huffman et al., 1988, EVANS-
COWLEY et al., 2005).   
This premise is examined widely in the North American 
literature.  Huffman et al (1988) also argue that developers do not 
absorb the costs by way of lower profit margins as in a competitive 
market profits are already at levels of return consistent with the 
opportunity cost.  Yinger (1998) confirms the pass on or pass back 
effect stating that “to the extent housing construction is 
competitive, development fees do not place any burden on 
developers” (Yinger, 1998, p 37)).  Evans-Cowley and Lawhon 
(2003) also note that developers do not absorb these costs by way 
of lower profits, as the market (through the land acquisition 
process) has already set the cost structure at which development is 
encouraged.  Research also confirms the premise that developers 
are likely to make investment decisions based on profitability and 
if that profitability is reduced in one area, it will move its 
operations to another to maximize profits (Evans-Cowley, 2003, 
Mathur et al., 2004, Burge, 2008).  In Australia, Watkins (1999) 
offers the only perverse theory, claiming via mathematical proofs 
that exactly half of any charge is absorbed by the developer by way 
of reduced profits, with the other half either passed on or back.  
Been notes that “Watkins did not provide an intuitive explanation 
for that surprising result, and his argument has been largely ignored 
in the literature.”  (Been, 2005, p 174).  
Hence the literature indicates that developers are in fact the 
least likely party to carry this cost burden.  The exception to this if 
the actual infrastructure charges imposed are greater than 
anticipated by the developer at the time of acquisition and market 
inelasticies prevent full passing on.  However, even in this 
instance, the developer will still seek to recoup the difference 
between the anticipated and actual charge by redesigning the 
project to obtain the desired profit margins (Huffman et al., 1988). 
In conclusion, “the assumption is that the developers will bear 
none of the fee because if their profit margins were high enough to 
absorb the fee, competition already would have either reduced the 
price of housing to the consumer or increased the prices paid to the 
landowner”  (Been, 2005, p153). 
 
 
3.2. The Landowner 
 
Consider next the original landowner who sells his/her englobo 
land to the developer.  When the infrastructure charge is 
anticipated, and the developer cannot pass those additional costs on 
to home buyers due to market conditions, the developer will seek 
to pay less for the undeveloped land.   
In the US, Huffman et al (1988) argue that this “back shifting” 
is unlikely in many instances because land owners have a 
reservation price, below which they will not sell.  Evans (Evans, 
2004b) confirms this phenomenon in the UK citing the introduction 
of a 100% betterment levy in 1947 resulted in a freeze of the land 
market, as there was no incentive for land owners to sell, and was 
repealed only three years later.  Subsequent attempts in the UK had 
  
similar supply constraining impacts and were abolished in 1985 
(Evans, 2004b). 
Whilst it is outside the scope of this brief paper to discuss the 
various mechanisms for recoupment of the cost of providing urban 
infrastructure, the concept of a “betterment tax” does have a place 
in this discussion as it relates to the passing back of infrastructure 
costs to the land owner and supports the argument for a consequent 
reduction in supply.  
The UK has a long history dating back to the 1940’s of taxing 
land owners for any “betterment” as a result of increases in value 
subsequent to the provision of infrastructure or later, from 
receiving favourable planning approvals.  It was thought unfair that 
the owners of land should be the beneficiaries of increased capital 
value purely through economic and/or population growth or the 
provision of public infrastructure (Evans, 2004b).  Hence, where 
this value uplift was due to infrastructure expenditure, this 
betterment levy was essentially a full passing back of the benefit of 
the infrastructure.  
Whilst the pass back effect will stall sales in the short term, 
Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessey (2004) argue that over the longer term 
back shifting can be possible.  They claim this can be due to either 
“general inflationary price increases” resulting in the reservation 
price being achievable, and/or weaker market conditions resulting 
in lowering of vendor expectations.  Whilst the latter does 
represent true back passing in weak market conditions, surely the 
former scenario is evidence of forward passing and supports the 
theory of increased house prices due to reduced supply (as a direct 
response to infrastructure charges) assuming at least constant 
demand, rather than “inflationary pressures”.   
It is interesting to note that, it is a recommendation of the 
Barker Review of Housing Supply (2004) that the UK government 
again pursue means to share in windfall profits (ie betterment) that 
arise as a result of planning approval, claiming that: “this Planning-
gain Supplement would fall largely on landowners, with little 
impact on house prices.” (Barker, 2004).  This is a clear 
acknowledgement that the alternative system of developer paid 
infrastructure charges are passed on to home buyers.    
In summary, to the extent that homeowners’ willingness to pay 
is less than the infrastructure charge itself, the difference would 
shift backwards to the vendor of the englobo land since developers 
are mobile and bear no burden in the long run (Yinger, 1998).  
However, the literature indicates that passing back does not 
generally occur as land owners have no compulsion to sell if not 
for profit (Evans, 2004b) and attempts at back passing instead 
stymie supply.   
 
 
3.3. The Home Buyer 
 
We consider finally the passing on of the infrastructure charge to 
the consumer or home buyer.  As discussed above, if neither the 
developer nor land owner is willing to bear the cost of these 
charges, then the burden must fall to the home buyer by way of 
higher house prices.   
This concept is consistently captured by a vast number of  
academics, particularly in the US and Canada over the past three 
decades including (but not limited to):  Ellickson (1977), Snyder, 
Stegman and Moreau (1986), Downing and McCaleb (1987), 
Huffman, Smith, Nelson and Stegman (1988), Delaney and Smith 
(1989), Singell and Lillydahl (1990), Skaburdis and Qadeer (1992), 
Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez (1993), Dresch and Sheffrin (1997), 
Brueckner (1997), Skidmore and Peddle (1998), Yinger (1998), 
Baden and Coursey (1999), Mayer and Sommerville (2000), 
Nelson and Lillydahl (2002), Nelson and Moody (2003), Evans-
Cowley and Lawhon (2003), Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessey (2004), 
Mathur, Waddell and Blanco (2004), Campbell (2004), Been 
(2005), Evans-Cowley, Forgey and Rutherford (2005), Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt (2006) and Burge (2008).   
It is difficult to select just one quote to capture such a weight of 
evidence and argument.  Mathur et al (2004) chose earlier work by 
Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez from 1993 in stating that “under tight 
market conditions … we would expect the fees to be passed on 
principally to consumers, while developers and land-owners would 
absorb most of the cost of the fees in the form of lower profits 
under soft market conditions”.  This is the overwhelming 
conclusion of the majority of the literature.  Burge (2008) notes 
that most studies assume a relatively normal price elasticity of 
demand, which he states is reasonable given infrastructure charges 
are generally used in growing jurisdictions, which are characterized 
by a competitive housing market, further supporting the 
proposition of a passing on of infrastructure costs to home buyers. 
With such a plethora of excellent literature on this topic, tested 
and developed over a number of decades, it is little wonder that in 
modern literature in countries such as the UK, US, India and 
Australia, it is a given that in a competitive market with elastic 
housing demand, whilst infrastructure charges in some instances 
may be borne by the developer and/or land owner in the short run, 
in the long run these costs are borne by the home owner by way of 
higher house prices  (3iNetwork, 2009, Infrastructure Charges 
Taskforce (ICT), 2011). 
In summary, with supporting literature dating back to the 
1970’s, current international literature now largely assumes it as 
given that infrastructure charges increase the price of new housing 
in the long run.   
 
 
3.4. Other Parties 
 
Whilst it is outside the direct scope of this paper, it is appropriate 
to acknowledge other parties that have been reported to carry the 
burden of the cost of infrastructure charges as well.   
US research suggests that existing home owners also share the 
burden by way of increased cost of existing housing (Singell and 
Lillydahl, 1990, Brueckner, 1997, Yinger, 1998).  More recently in 
Australia, it has been acknowledged that if the infrastructure 
charge does not fully pay for the actual cost of the infrastructure, 
the gap is paid for by both new and existing home owners by way 
of increased local jurisdictional rates (Chan, 2009, Infrastructure 
Charges Taskforce (ICT), 2011).  One US paper even purports that 
this burden may also fall on the providers of capital.  Ellickson and 
Been (2005) argue that if all developers are subject to 
infrastructure charges, they will have a lesser propensity to proceed 
with projects and “as a result lenders would have to charge lower 
interest rates to induce them to proceed.”  (Been, 2005, p 173) . 
 
The theoretical work is therefore consistent in its conclusions 
that despite market conditions (that is relative market elasticities) 
infrastructure charges in virtually all instances are passed onto 
home buyers in the long run and will thus lead to increased housing 
prices and hence reduced housing affordability.   
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
If the theoretical work is largely consistent in its conclusions that 
infrastructure charges lead to increased housing prices, the next 
question that follows is:  how much do house prices increase by?   
This review of the literature has been unable to identify any 
empirical research from the UK on whether either the betterment or 
the planning obligation methodologies over or under passes the 
cost of infrastructure provision, whether that be on passed to the 
home buyer, or back passed to the land seller.  Bramley (2005) 
provides anecdotal evidence only.  However, there is a well 
established body of empirical research that has evolved from this 
theoretical evidence on the cost impact of impact fees on new 
housing in the US over the past 35+ years.  
  
Been (2005) provides a comprehensive and chronological 
overview of the empirical research from 1989 to 2004.  She 
identifies up to a dozen separate North American studies on the 
price impacts of infrastructure charges on new housing costs, a 
number of which also examine the price impact on existing 
housing.  Separate studies are found from both Canada and the US. 
Burge (2008) makes the observation that much of the early 
work suffers from weaknesses in methodology and lack of 
appropriate data.  In his 2008 work, Burge identifies a further three 
papers that post date Been’s critique.  A further paper by Lawhon 
(2004) from research carried out in 1996 is not cited by either of 
these works.   
Review of this literature reveals it is a danger to assume that 
passing, or shifting of costs is at parity (ie. $1 extra for 
infrastructure charges = $1 passed on or back).  Research from the 
USA indicates that it is common for “over shifting” to occur, with 
home buyers paying a greater incremental increase in the cost of 
the new home (as compared to the cost of the infrastructure charge) 
as developers seek compensation for the additional risk taken and 
return on costs (Mathur et al., 2004, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004, Campbell, 2004).  Further, this overshifting can also be 
combined with back passing to land owners (Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004), with developers requiring higher profit 
margins to compensate them for the additional uncertainty 
associated with a rapidly changing regulatory environment. 
In this short article, it is not possible to analyse each of these 
models.  Suffice to say, that whilst the findings are consistent in 
quantifying a consistent “overshifting” of infrastructure charges to 
new (and existing) housing prices, the methodologies used vary 
greatly, as does the extent of overshifting identified.  In these 
studies, a $1 infrastructure charge is attributed to from as little as a 
$0.13 for the developed lot only (EVANS-COWLEY et al., 2005), 
$0.23 increase in new house price (Dresch and Sheffrin 1997) and 
up to $3.58 increase in new house price (Singell and Lillydahl, 
1990).  If we assume that subsequent works build on prior works, 
let us then focus the remainder of this discussion on the several 
works from the past decade. 
Brief details of each of the empirical works post dating 2000 
are listed in Table 1 for the purpose of providing an appreciation of 
the range of work on this topic, as well as in the variance in 
approach and findings. 
The research in the last decade from the US indicates that for 
every $1.00 increase in infrastructure charges, new housing costs 
increase by $1.50 to $1.70 (Burge, 2008).  This concept of “over 
shifting” for new housing is consistent across all of the research to 
date.  What is also evident is that this price impact is passed on at 
varying rates depending on the characteristics of the housing, with 
the implication that more affordable homes bear less of this burden 
than arguably those who can afford to pay more (less price 
sensitive). 
Baden and Coursey (1999) provides some insight into this over 
shifting phenomenon, explaining that infrastructure charges add 
additional uncertainties and delay costs in the approval process, 
resulting in developers recouping more than the cost of the fees 
alone.  So not only are impact fees passed directly onto 
homeowners, there is an overshifting effect to compensate 
developers firstly for the additional uncertainty (risk) and secondly 
a return of funds invested component, either for the developer, or 
its financier over the development period.  Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessey (2004) and Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) provide a 
very different explanation, claiming that infrastructure charges add 
value to home buyers which they willingly capitalised into the 
home price as an upfront payment.  This value may be in the form 
of additional amenity, or expected future savings in jurisdictional 
rates due to the upfront payment of the infrastructure provide by 
the charges.  The difference in these two explanations is explored 
further in the following section.  
 
Table 1: Empirical Research Models and Findings  
Year/Author Methodology Impact* 
2004 
Mathur, 
Waddell and 
Blanco 
Hedonic model based on the 
value of new homes in 3 
price categories across 38 
cities and towns 1991-2000 
[Washington] 
 
Low quality  $0.60 
Mid quality $1.66 
High quality $3.58 
2004 
Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessey 
Hedonic and repeat sales 
and regression methods 
(using time series data) for 
39,792 new homes and 
107,376 existing homes and 
land [Florida] 
 
$1.64 increase for new 
homes 
$1.68 increase for 
existing homes.   
 
$1.00 decrease for 
undeveloped land 
2004 
Campbell 
Hedonic modeling for 
279,000 new and existing 
homes and 45,000 vacant 
land sales 1997 – 2001 
[Orlando SMSA] 
 
$1.60 new homes 
$1.00 existing homes 
 
Land results are not 
conclusive 
 
2005 
Evans-
Cowley, 
Forgey and 
Rutherford 
 
Pooled cross-sectional OLS 
+ fixed and random effects 
models. 1999 data.  [43 
cities in Austin, fort Worth, 
Dallas and Houston] 
 
Lot value increases by 
1.3% for developed 
land ($0.13 increase) 
Undeveloped land 
decease of 0.042% 
($0.04 decrease)  
 
2006 
Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt 
House price indices + 
regression analysis for new 
and existing homes in 41 
counties for small, medium 
and large homes (by square 
footage) 1993-2003 
Small home  $0.38 
Mid size $0.82 
Large home $1.27 
[Florida] 
*Accumulative impact to house prices for each additional $1.00 of infrastructure 
charges.  Source:  Author, Been (2005) and Burge (2008)  
 
Evans-Cowley et al’s 2005 work took an alternative approach, 
instead examining the pass on price effect on the developed lot.  
This work follows on from Skaburskis and Qadeer (1992) in 
Canada and Nelson et al (1992) in US who had previously 
examined price impacts on vacant lots (as compared to built 
homes).  This significantly lower passing on result could be 
interpreted as evidence of profiteering by house builders.  This  
would be a troubling finding as house builders (as opposed to land 
developers) are not subject to any infrastructure charges.  Evans- 
Cowley et al provide no discussion on this important finding.  
It is interesting to note that Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessey 
(2004), Campbell (2004) and Evans-Cowley et al (2005) also 
sought to quantify the pass back price impact to the original land 
owner.  Their result varied widely from “inconclusive”, to a $0.04 
to $1.00 decrease (pass back).  Hence it would appear that the 
extent of back shifting of infrastructure charges is still open to 
debate with even the empirical research being inconsistent and 
inconclusive (EVANS-COWLEY et al., 2005).  
It is interesting that the majority of the studies result in a ratio 
of cost shifting, equating a $1 (or $1,000) of infrastructure charge 
to an increase in house prices proportionate to that charge.  With 
the exception of Evans-Cowley et al, none of the research relates 
this price increase to average housing prices to consider the 
proportional increase in average house price to the consumer.  This 
is an interesting omission considering housing affordability is at 
the core of each of these arguments.  Further research could take 
into account how these increases in house prices translate to 
housing affordability.   
In summary, despite Burge (2008) claiming that the studies 
carried out from 2000 onwards are based on more appropriate data 
and a more evolved methodology than those from the 1980’s and 
1990’s, and some patterns arguably established, there are still wide 
variances in the findings and the methodologies applied.  Been 
(2005) spends considerable time critiquing Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessey’s work, particularly the explanations for its findings, 
  
which are addressed in the following section.  In any event, her 
position is that “the literature overall raises serious doubts about 
whether the models are insufficiently or incorrectly specified” 
(Been, 2005, p163).  Given Campbell’s (2004) work is largely 
similar in methodology and findings to Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessey’s, and that Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) are also 
proponents of similar methodology, this situation may very well 
still exist.  
 
 
5. OVERSHIFTING:  BENEFIT OR BURDEN 
 
In the preceding discussion, it has been established that the 
international theoretical evidence is conclusive that infrastructure 
charges increase housing costs.  How much housing costs are 
actually increased by has been the subject of considerable study 
only in the US where the empirical models confirm not only 
passing on of infrastructure costs to home buyers, but significant 
“over shifting” of these costs.  Whilst these studies remain 
inconclusive, not only in range of findings, but also in their 
explanation of why this over shifting occurs, a mean range of $1.50 
to $1.70 for each $1.00 of infrastructure charge is apparent.  
Discussion around the cause of this overshifting can be broken 
down into a review of the relative benefit or burden of 
infrastructure charges.   
 
 
5.1. Burden:  Uncertainty 
 
Let us first discuss the burden effect.  As stated previously, this 
over shifting phenomenon has been attributed in some US literature 
to infrastructure charges adding additional uncertainties and delay 
costs in the approval process, resulting in developers recouping 
more than the cost of the fees alone.  So not only are impact fees 
passed directly onto homeowners, there is an overshifting effect to 
compensate developers firstly for the additional uncertainty (risk) 
and secondly a return of funds invested component, either for the 
developer, or its financier over the development period (Baden and 
Coursey, 1999). 
Whilst this explanation appears intuitive and in line with 
common thinking, there are others within the US and Australia 
who argue the opposite, claiming that infrastructure charges 
actually increase certainty.  Nelson et al (1992) supported by Burge 
(2008) maintain that infrastructure charges reduce uncertainty by 
virtue of timely provision of public infrastructure, that may expand 
the supply of buildable land.  In her Australian review, Gurran et al 
(2009) claim that the negotiated approach in the UK reduces risks 
for developers.  This seems counter intuitive, with any unknown in 
the costing process adding uncertainty for developers.  This is 
further compounded by the unpredictable delays (and costs) 
incurred in the negotiation process (Bramley and Leishman, 2005, 
Chan, 2009, Buitelaar, 2007).   
This UK infrastructure charges system differs to that in the US 
and parts of Australia as it is a process based solely on negotiation 
between developer and the local authority, rather than being based 
on either future infrastructure construction cost estimates as is the 
case in much of the US and parts of Australia, or pre-set rates per 
dwelling (as is the now the case in Queensland, Australia).  
Reliance on negotiated outcomes is also argued to disadvantage 
smaller developers by virtue of factors such as influence, 
knowledge, cost and negotiating power (Evans, 2004a) and this can 
be interpolated to further disadvantage the home buyers in those 
smaller estates who may then be subject to not only higher charges, 
but also greater overshifting.  
Perhaps this discussion is an oversimplification of 
infrastructure charging as a cost shifting concept, and further 
analysis of the actual policy implementation mechanism is required 
to ensure comparisons (and assumptions) made are actually 
comparing like with like.  
In any case, it can be concluded that if overshifting is due to 
developers recouping a higher risk premium to compensate them 
for the uncertainty associated with the local infrastructure charges 
regime, then homebuyers are bearing this additional cost burden by 
the amount of the overshifting.  This is a critical concept for policy 
makers to be aware of when designing infrastructure charging 
regimes.   
 
 
5.2. Benefit:  Old View v. New View 
 
An interesting proposition that been discussed sporadically in the 
US literature over the years is the concept of whether the increase 
in house prices due to infrastructure charges is a one off excise tax 
payable by the home owner for no net benefit, or capitalisation of 
expected future benefits arising from the provision of said 
infrastructure.   
This is the concept of the “old view” versus the “new view” in 
infrastructure charge price effects, phrases first coined by Yinger 
(1998) and taken up again by Nelson and Moody (2003), Ihlanfeldt 
and Shaughnessey (2004), Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) and Burge 
(2008).  The old view considers infrastructure charges as a 
traditional “excise tax on developers” (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004) and does not take into consideration any value attributed by 
the homeowner to the amenity received from the infrastructure 
provided.   
The new view assumes three key differences:  1)  it 
incorporates the added amenity of the new infrastructure provided 
by those funds levied,  2)  it assumes capitalisation of future local 
jurisdictional rates savings due to the pre-payment of new 
infrastructure costs by way of infrastructure charges and 3) it 
assumes new homebuyers are mobile (will move to an area that 
does not levy such fees if they do not wish to pay them/value the 
additional amenity) (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004). 
Under the new view, the increase in housing prices as a result 
of infrastructure charges is due to the home buyer’s willingness to 
capitalise into the cost of the home the value they derive from that 
infrastructure and/or perceived future rates savings.  These costs 
will be overshifted to the extent that home buyers value more 
highly those benefits over the cost of providing them. Given the 
home buyer receives a benefit which it has paid for (by way of 
addition house price) there is no burden.   
On the face of it, the new view assumes a mature market that 
has a well established and predictable infrastructure charge and 
local jurisdictional rating system.  It also assumes this system and 
the quantum of costs is well understood not only the policy makers, 
the development industry, land holders and home buyers.  It must 
also be assumed that the homeowner does in fact receive the value 
of the services and infrastructure provided by these additional fees 
in the foreseeable future.  Further, there must be a precedent for a 
significant reductions in local jurisdictional rates for home buyers 
to be willing up pay the up front cost of such benefits.  In a market 
such as Florida, where infrastructure charges have been common 
place since at least the early 1980’s, this general market knowledge 
may exist for the new view to prevail.  However, not even Been is 
convinced of this:  “An increase in the value of the home of 
between $1.00 and $1.68 per $1.00 of impact fee on the promise of 
a rate rollback seems extraordinarily optimistic on the part of the 
homebuyers  (Been, 2005, p 162). 
In many parts of world, infrastructure charges are evolving 
policy.  For example, in the State of Queensland, Australia the 
infrastructure charges regime by comparison is in its infancy.  
After five years of legislative reform, the most recent enabling 
legislation the Sustainable Planning (Housing Affordability and 
Infrastructure Charges Reform) Amendments Bill 2011, 
commenced in July 2011, which introduced maximum charges 
  
across the State.  This followed a period of considerable 
uncertainty of charges with protracted negotiation of outcomes 
within a supposed cost recovery framework.  In parts of 
Queensland, infrastructure charges increased by more than 100% in 
the last decade (Productivity Commission, 2011).  It is fair to 
conclude then that Queensland does not meet the criteria of a well 
established and predicable infrastructure charging system, and that 
the old view will prevail for a number of years after stabilisation of 
the current system.   
As can be seen, the literature is still split on the reasons for the 
overshifting phenomenon associated with infrastructure charges.  If 
overshifting is due to structural uncertainty, then home owners are 
bearing this additional burden, brought on by the nature and/or 
implementation of the infrastructure charging policy.  However, if 
the new view premise holds, and infrastructure charges actually 
reduce uncertainty, then outstanding research question evolves.  
Rather than asking whether infrastructure charges increase housing 
costs, perhaps the question becomes:  Does the home buyer gain 
the full benefit of the cost that they have paid?   
Clearly, further examination of this overshifting phenomenon 
is required, and will be the subject of further more detailed 
research. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to build on existing North 
American literature, examining the international evidence that 
suggests infrastructure charges contribute to increased house prices 
and reduced housing affordability.   
It has been found that there is an overwhelming body of 
theoretical evidence dating back to the 1970’s that theorises who 
bears the cost of infrastructure charges for new homes.  This 
evidence has been conclusive in its findings to the extent that 
current international literature now largely assumes it as given that 
infrastructure charges increase the price of new housing in the long 
run  
The next step was to establish:  if infrastructure charges 
increase house prices, then by how much?  A number of empirical 
studies from the US were identified that confirmed significant 
overshifting, with house prices consistently increasing by greater 
than the amount of the infrastructure charge.  It is somewhat 
surprising that no empirical work has been carried out on this topic 
outside of the US, despite the wide usage of infrastructure charges 
in many countries.  It is important that policy makers are equipped 
with such information so as to fully understand the impacts of the 
infrastructure charges levied.   
The paper concludes that whilst the empirical evidence of over 
shifting is largely consistent, with house prices found to increase 
by greater than the infrastructure charge, there remains 
considerable debate over whether this represents a burden to new 
home buyers or not and whether findings from one country can be 
directly transposed to another.   Any future attempt to carry out 
such quantitative research will require further evolution of the 
models used to date, together with careful consideration of the 
various jurisdictional differences in schemes as well as local 
taxation regimes.   
Despite the plethora of international research to date, a number 
of outstanding research questions remain unanswered, particularly 
for countries other than US. 
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